OBAMA'S CHOICES IN AFGHANISTAN

Stay the course or a new direction?


There are presently (as of November 2008) approximately 70,000 allied troops in Afghanistan and we are "losing the war" according to our military advisors(rf: Antony Cordesman CSIS). On all sides one hears..."we need more troops". In a Washington Post article dated November 22, 2008, Defense Secretary Gates stated that he supported a buildup of an additional 20,000 US troops for Afghanistan in the next 12-18 months. That would mean we would have nearly 90,000 troops in that war torn nation. That was close to the level of Soviet troops during the initial phase of their occupation. Will it change anything? Herodotus of Halicarnassus (born in 484BC in what is Bodrum, Turkey today ) would have been familiar with this land of Afghanistan and would have certainly thought that history would give us an answer. The father of history is famous for his statement that though history does not repeat itself, human beings in similar circumstances are wont to do similar things...and that we would be wise to learn about those circumstances..so we do not repeat these old mistakes over and over again. Unfortunately, Americans in general, are not not history devotees--to our perpetual loss and discomfort. But it was Niccolo Machiavelli who (after reading Herodotus) may have said it best: "Whomever wishes to foresee the future must consult the past; for human events ever resemble those of preceding times. This arises from the fact that they are produced by men who ever have been, and ever shall be, animated by the same passions, and thus they necessarily have the same results." And I add here Mr. Lincoln's warning to us all: "Fellow citizens, we cannot escape the past!" So in the case of Afghanistan we have a ready "case history", an open book of a most recent conflict there before us. But have we used it?

Afghanistan located in the middle east about 7000 miles from Washington DC. wedged between Iran and Pakistan. It is a nation of about the size of Texas (and close to that latitude as well) but with much greater relief, having half of its land area above 6500 feet, or well more than a mile high. The rugged Pamir Range and the Hidu Kush, parts of the Himalaya Range, make up these highlands.

The Soviet War in Afghanistan spanned the period form August 7, 1979 to May 15, 1988. Nine years of war in which more than 100,000 Soviet (now Russian) troops were deployed in a futile attempt to control an unruly people in a daunting climate and imposing terrane. As we read this essay keep in mind that the Soviets were fighting closer to home, on their near borders. Afghanistan is about 1000 miles from their southern, nearest border, while we, on the other hand have immensely long lines of supply (through Pakistan) of more than seven times that distance.

At this time, the causes for that Afghan-Soviet war are immaterial, but the circumstances and the analogies to our situation and the consequences are important aspects we should study carefully.

Invasion and Early Phase
After taking control of major urban centers, military bases and strategic installations by December 1979 the Soviet forces appeared to have the upper hand. But the large presence of USSR troops appears to have only exacerbated nationalist feelings and did not have the effect of pacifying the nation that the invaders expected. Furthermore, the Afghan army was not trustworthy and as a consequence the Soviets were increasingly drawn into fighting urban uprisings, tribal armies, and even rebellious Afghan army units. These engagements served only to further antagonize the Afghans. Soviet air power was used effectively against these uprisings when they fought as massed units. The control of air power caused the insurgency to subside temporarily.

The Guerrilla War
Between 1980 and 1985 the war evolved into a new pattern in which the Soviets occupied the cities and main axes of communication, while the mujahideen, in small groups, waged an effective guerrilla war. As a consequence, most (some estimate as much as 80%) of the country was never under USSR control. Periodically, the USSR launched major offences into guerrilla occupied areas but the overall situation was unchanged.


The Surge of Soviet Troops Phase
In March of 1985, under the direction of a new Soviet General Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, who was unhappy with the way the war was being fought, nearly ten thousand additional Soviet troops were sent to Afghanistan. The build-up brought the troop level at this stage to 108,000 Russian troops (not counting civilian and KGB operatives) and initiated 1985 as the bloodiest year of the war. Though the mujahideen suffered heavy losses, they remained in the field and continued to resist the Soviets effectively.


Middle Phase..thinking of withdrawal
From April 1985 to January 1987 began the implementation of a new phase..an exit strategy in which Soviet troops were limited to a supporting role for the Afghan army, such as air and artillery support, and technical assistance...though some large scale offensive actions were engaged in when it appeared they might be advantageous. By this time the Afghan Army had an official strength of 302,000 (1986) (and with Soviet forces at 108,000 there were more than 410,000 men in Afghanistan under arms by 1987.

Last Phase
Between 1987 and February 1989, the last phase of the war, the Soviet army remained in defensive positions as they prepared for withdrawal. From May to August 1988 half of the troops were withdrawn and from November to February 1989 the remainder of Soviet troops left the country.

Soviet Costs
More that 600,000 troops served in Afghanistan (but not more that 108,000 at one time), 14,500 were killed, 54,000 wounded, 400,000 fell sick from various diseases (hepatitis, typhoid fever were common due to difficult terrain and lack of sanitary facilities) Almost 11,000 Soviet army men were discharged as permanently disabled. There were heavy losses of weaponry and aircraft:more than 100 planes, 300 helicopters, and nearly 150 tanks were lost, and over 11,000 trucks and tankers were destroyed or stolen.


Cost to Afghans
Over one million Afghans were killed, five million became refugees to Pakistan and Iran, another 2 million were displaced within Afghanistan. More than a million Afghan fighters were disabled, and three million non-combatants maimed or wounded.
Farming the country's mainstay was devastated by destruction of irrigation systems (essential in Afghanistan's dry upland climate), killing of livestock, and bombing of farm fields. A post-war Swedish study revealed that 1/4 of all Afghan farmers had their irrigation systems destroyed and livestock shot.


Cities were depopulated. Kandahar a major center of population in the south was reduced from a population of 200,000 to 25,000, by Soviet carpet bombing and bulldozing.

Landmines killed 25,000 Afghans during the war.Another 10-15 million landmines unmarked and forgotten remain scattered over the countryside. Child mortality had climbed to 31% just prior to the Soviet withdrawal, and of those children who did survive, 67% were deemed severely malnourished by a UN study team.


To exploit the ethnic diversity of Afghanistan the Soviets Used standard "divide and conquer military practices". They purposely weakened the culture of Afghans by weakening traditional Islamic practices, generated refugee groups which departed from traditional home areas as they were forced to flee fighting. Thus intensifying ethnic differences and increasing inter-ethnic and sectarian animosities between formerly amicable groups. By the end of the conflict, a shared Afghan cultural unity had disappeared and the nation had been split into diverse ethnic enclaves with little or no culture, language and religion in common.

Finally the Soviet withdrawl led to the Civil War 1989-1992) See: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_war_in_Afghanistan

Addendum
An interesting piece summarized from the LA Times of Nov 23,08 by Megan Stack, "Retired general looks back Russo-Afghan war."

General Ruslan Aushev should know. He served five years in Afghanistan, was wounded, and named a "Hero of the Soviets" and now heads the Afghan Veterans society. What lessons did he learn from his experiences in the 1980s?


According to Stack's piece, Gen Aushev claims the US is making the same mistakes as the former Soviets. They set up a weak leader in Babrak Karmal, who had little "prestige" with the people. "We tried to mold the people into a Soviet way of life where religion is separated from the state..and imposed youth organizations, but in a nation that was still in the Dark Ages", said Aushev.

In regard to troop numbers Aushev said, "with more troops what will change? Even with 200,000 troops, at night the Taliban come and then they are in charge. You must talk with the Taliban to come to terms..they must be engaged in negotiations."

He added: "The Taliban are an idea (not an organization) you must sit down and think what to do with it (the idea)."

"One year after we were welcomed in 1979, we had 40% of the people hating us, five years later 60%, and when we pulled out, 90% hated us..so we understood finally we were fighting (not the Taliban) but the people."

"More than a million Afghans died and 14,000 Russians ...I am sorry we did that," said Ausheve.