DUMB STUFF AT BOEING AND FAA

DUMB AND DEADLY STUFF AT BOEING AND FAA

I read this week (March 31,2019) in Der Spiegel (on line) that China has just concluded a 30 billion Euro ($34 billion) deal with the French-German Airbus company for 300  of its 320 neo airliners.  Our own USA company Boeing didn’t get the contract with its newer (2017) 737 Max 8.  Boeing has been roiled with conflict and controversy as a result of the two recent crashes of its new airliner and the  international grounding of the Max 8 airplane.  These  two ill fated “brand new” planes met disaster under very similar circumstances.  The first in October of last year in Indonesia and the recent (March 10) flight  in Ethiopia.   The tragic accidents  took the lives of a total of 346 passengers.       

At the time of the crashes, Boeing had delivered 350 Max 8s world wide in 2017. Of these  72 were in service in the USA, at  American, Southwest and United airlines.  Boeing had signed orders for about 5000 worldwide and other potential sales may have brought that number to as  high as 8000 planes.  The potential sales for Boeing prior to the crashes might   have been worth as much as1.6 x10 12th  or $1.6 trillion dollars.  Those figures represented an enormous incentive to cut corners.  

The probable causes of these aviation disasters seems to be the result of decisions made with less than adequate regard for safety at Boeing and more egregiously, the results of lack of manpower and laxity at the FAA—our US government agency.  The FAA—with a reputation as the best in the world—is charged with advancing the aviation industry—AND as well a being the guarding and overseeing our nation’s airline safety.   This was a bad combination.  Here is how this author sees it.  

USA’s Boeing and the EU’s Airbus are the two aviation giants and are fierce competitors.  Both build planes for the  hugely profitable and essential aerospace domestic and foreign transportation industry. Both companies  are also acutely aware of the massive new markets for their products especially that which is developing in China (1.4 billion population) and the third world nations. 

Sometime prior to about 2011, Boeing’s EU competitor Airbus designed and began production of a new addition to their fleet, known as the Airbus A320 neo. The new model was planned  to be sold to airlines for use in the world’s  most common and profitable routes, and to compete directly with Boeing’s workhorse and immensely popular  737 model, which was first produced in the 1960s.  The most common design used by the world’s carriers on these routes is the single aisle, @ 200 seat, “slim line” planes with flying ranges of about  2000-6000 miles.   Consequently, Airbus’ new 320 neo was completely redesigned from fuselage on up, Airbus also installed a new class of turbo fan-jet engines—the CFM Leap X.  This new engine, a USA-French designed and built, incorporated cutting-edge technological advances in design as well as  lighter, stronger materials to produce more efficient fuel to power conversion.  The new, more powerful—with larger diameter “nacelles” (its forward air scoop)  yet efficient, engines permitted Airbus to promise purchasers a 7%-15% reduction in fuel consumption, (a practical guarantee to more profitable operation).  As well as more fuel efficiency, the new engines were so designed to  significantly reduce “down time” for maintenance and repairs.  The new Airbus claimed its customers would have  the  the potential to  increase profits by a jaw dropping 15%. These new additions to the market were a threat to Boeing’s market dominance.

Boeing had maintained preeminence over many decades in new airplane sales with its immensely  popular 737 model.  But by 2014-15 these early 747s  had now seen  20-30 years of service  and carriers around the world were seeking to replace them.  At Boeing headquarters the threat of this new Airbus entry to the market had to be addressed as rapidly as possible.  Thousands of new orders for replacement planes were going to be made within a short number of years and as well there was the growing market in China.  Boeing officials were (I suspect)  determined to keep their company in the lead.  

Thus when American Airlines announced (2014?) that it was considering purchasing the new Airbus 320neo the top “decision makers” at Boeing headquarters realized  that it was too late  to redesign a completely new plane.  What had to be addressed from a profit perspective  was the threat of increased efficiency of the new Airbus neo.  Thus, it was essential that Boeing’s new addition had to include the new more powerful, bigger and efficient US-French engines.   Boeing, responding to market exigencies and time factors made the decision to simply install the new  engines on their well-established long in-use 737 fuselage. This was a corporate response —a “quick fix”— to catch up with the threat to sales from the Airbus’ 320neo. Adding a new engine—particularly a bigger engine—such as Leap X—to a complex structure such as an airplane would normally entail redesigning fuselage, wings, landing gear, etc. and other elements of the airframe  to complement the new more powerful engines. Boeing did no do that.  

Tasked with making the changes, Boeing engineers did the best they could when they installed the new, larger Leap X engines on the existing 737 fuselages to create what was then called the 737Max 8 (there is also a Max 7-10). The new engines were larger in diameter and had to be positioned on the low slung wings of the 737 in such a way as to prevent their air scoops from being too close to the ground.  But the new engine installations and their new wing-positions changed the complex aerodynamics of to the plane  Air trials of the new Max 8 revealed that with this new powerful engine configuration the Max 8 had a tendency to poke its nose up too high as it was taking off.  This could cause what is called a “stall”.  Not like a stall in an automobile.  The airplane stall is more sinister—it causes it to lose lift and to fall taoward earth.  

What is a stall and how do wings crate lift?  The wings of an airplane are not flat.  Wings have a flat bottom but are bowed over the top surface,  In normal flight this wing cross-section forces the air to flow over the top of the wing more rapidly than over lower surface. The result is a decrease in atmospheric pressure all along the wing’s upper surface.  In effect the lowered pressure on the wing upper surface  “sucks” the wings upward—or produces “lift”— as a result of lower pressure on to top of the wing and higher pressure underneath.   The cross sectional shape shape of the wing (called an “airfoil”) gives the plane its lift.  (The same effect of low pressure develops in the leading surface of full sail of a moving sailboat)    Recall pictures of early model airplanes.  These early models were built with robust struts (or strong wires)  on the underwings to prevent the powerful forces of low air pressure on the upper surfaces (lift) from bending  the wings upward— like flapping wings of a crow or bluebird.    

In some circumstances the wing can lose its lift.  For example when Ice forms on the leading edge of a wing it can disrupt the smooth airflow over the top surface and decrease or obliterate lift. The leading edges of most planes have means of dislodging ice to prevent this.  In other circumstances if  a pilot tries to raise the nose of the aircraft too steeply, the air flowing over the top of the airfoil wing (its “angle of attack”) disrupts sloth air flow and causes  irregular flow called “turbulence”.  Turbulence over the top of the wing destroys lift.  Th will cause a stall.  If the plane stall it actually falls toward the earth responding to gravity.  It’s wings no longer providing adequate lift.  At high altitudes planes can easily recover from a stall—but not when they are close to the earth such as in a take off.  

As a result of this fault in the 737 Max 8. plane’s new design Boeing engineers were tasked with making a correction in the plane’s automatic pilot controls.  They installed an automatic pilot on the plane that would automatically take over when sensors on the nose detected that the plane was rising too steeply (as in take offs).  This system would take control of the plane mechanics and force the nose of the pane downward—toward to level it and prevent a stall.  Sadly this was not adequate to prevent two disastrous crashes and the loss of hundreds of lives.  

One must question the decision making process at Boeing where completion for market share may have played too powerful a role. But we can expect that from corporate leaders.  But government regulators charged with maintaining passenger safety can not be excused so easily.   At best we can conclude that the formerly lauded FAA perhaps was not as concerned about safe airplane design and passenger safety as they should have been.  

This does not