George Will, the Washington Post journalist and popular TV talking head who is often considered the intelligent conservative’s columnist, has called for the US to get out of Afghanistan. See: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08/31/AR2009083102912.html (downloaded September 1, 2009)
This author agrees wholeheartedly. As a nation, our policies have caused more harm to that isolated and mountainous country than any good our continued stay might acheive. Our pre-Soviet-invasion-support for the anti-communist insurgency as well as our self-serving support for the Mujahedeen in the ensuing Soviet-Afghan war (where according to some, we actually worked to encourage the Soviet invasion as an anti-communist cold-war policy) caused untold harm there in the decade of the 1980s. While our recent invasion, after 2001, to "out" the Taliban and "capture or kill"--one man-- Osama Bin Laden, has horribly compounded those effects. (Since those simpler times, our reason for being in Afghanistan has slowly morphed from that into several less clear and logical others.) But perhaps at this point, simple benign neglect is what the Afghan State needs and deserves from us now.
The reaction to Mr. George Will's Afghan column came out of a dark silent night like a drone hit on the GOP right wing and the "any war is a good war" neocon supporters. As I see it also hammered home another nail in the Bush-Cheney foreign policy coffin. Coming from Mr Will, who is well known hawk and a strong supporter of ex-President George Bush's foreign policy, as well as part of conservative cadre of intellectuals in Washington this was damaging. Will kept the drum-beat for Bush's so-called "international war on terror". And he is a Washington insider who has never heard of a troop increase, or invasion he didn't support (up to now). He is an odd bedfellow for those of us who are opposed to this war.
Will's piece in the WaPo begins by stating that our weary engagement in Afghanistan has a long history. It is an old war already. Will points out that we have been there nearly twice as long as our involvement in the two great world wars. And what have we accomplished? Answering that question George Will politely skewers the neocon talking heads and medal-bedecked generals who are caught in a Ground Hog Day mentality concerning how to "win" in Afghanistan. Will to his benefit sees no options of success in that quarter, and I agree. He points out that our so-called “new” strategy of “protecting the population” is one that is heavily dependent upon more American troops. This “troop intensive” policy puts great pressure on an already strained military and greatly increases the likelihood for our forces to be targeted and killed or injured. Furthermore, the related policy of “clear, hold and build” cannot work where the Taliban (Will’s term..but the vast majority of forces opposing the US are local war lords and “ethnics” and have little coherence with the Taliban per se) can melt into the mountainous country-side, re-gather elsewhere and attack other unprotected areas. The Taliban's strategy recalls for me General McArthur’s "island hopping policy" used in the Pacific during WWII against entrenched Japanese forces on heavily fortified islands—McArthur just avoided strongly defended places and attacked elsewhere. Furthermore, Will states that the numbers just do not add up...just 4000 Marines are available to “hold” all of Helmand Province-- a region the size of West Virginia. He goes on to examine the US policy of “building” a coherent Afghan state that will be strong enough to avoid becoming a base for potential Islamic terrorism. Will states that “nation building would be impossible (in Afghanistan) “even if we knew how (to do it), and even if Afghanistan were not the second-worst place to try..” (after Somalia).
According to recent news reports, President Obama (who is reputedly unsettled about the military's--call it Petraeus--"pressuring him very early in his term for more troops which he alreay sent) is considering again increasing US forces from the present 68,000 to a total of 110,000. He should avoid the pressuse this time. As this author recalls, that is about the same number the Russians fielded in Afghanistan during the war years which ended in ignoble defeat. They struggled for nine long years and finally retreated with their tails between their legs. Is that what we have to expect? According to Will's analysis....yes.
I recall as well, one more very significant difference between our adventure in Afghanistan and that of the Soviet's, one I learned about in my ROTC military science classes at St. Peter's College during the Vietnam era..and that is that the USSR lines of supply were short in 1979, recall that the Soviets or that era were near-neighbors of Afghanistan---while our main supply bases are many thousands of miles away. Recent Taliban attacks on our supply lines passing through the steep mountain passes between Afghanistan and Pakistan often hold up truck convoys for days. Recently, the US has attempted to establish a land-based supply line through Russia (!) and even Iran(!!). But as of this writing, I have learned that a good part of our supplies now arrive in Afghanistan via dangerous and expensive air cargo flights.
As a footnote, I add here a brief summary of the Soviet experience in Afghanistan.
The 1979 Soviet Invasion lasted nine years—between 1979-1989. The initial invasion forces from near-by USSR landed in December 1979 and constituted over 100,000 troops and nearly 2000 tanks. President Carter at the time claimed that the invasion (which was requested of the Soviets by the legitimate Afghan government at the time) was the “greatest threat to world peace since World War II”. (Does that hyperbole sound familiar?) Over the nine years of fierce fighting, the Soviets were able to occupy the large cities and main axes of transport and communication, but never controlled more than one third of the country. (That is the situation the US finds itselves in now) By the mid 1980s, General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev--unhappy with the war and its costs--initiated what we might call a “troop surge” in which USSR forces grew to nearly 110,000, but the situation for the Soviets did not change for the better. By 1986 a more desperate Soviet exit strategy included a policy of building up an Afghanistan Army of more than 300,000 troops to take over as the Soviet troops left. (Does that sound familiar?) The troops finally did leave early in 1989 after concluding non-aggression agreements with the scattered Afghan opponents.
The war left more than fifty thousand Soviet troops dead and many thousands more injured and disabled. Over one-million Afghans were killed and another 2 million were displaced to Pakistan, Iran and elsewhere. Half of the refugees in the entire world in the 1980s were Afghans. More than a million Afghan combatants were wounded and disabled and three million non-combatants were maimed or wounded.
Mr George Will states that “counter-insurgency theory" suggest that the time and ratio of forces required to protect the population in Afghanistan "indicates Afghanistan would need “hundreds of thousands of troops to be deployed there for decades to achieve the goals our leaders are enunciating as the reasons for our continued occupation of Afghanistan. For Will, and for most Americans presently suffering the worst economic downturn since the great depression--such a commitment of the nation's energies, wealth and blood is “inconceivable”.
I agree. How could we justify such a commitment? It is clear that a simple cost-benefit analysis of the potential threat that (a worst case scenario) chaotic Afghanistan would pose to US interests versus the costs in loss-of-life and money (after a US pull-out) could not conceivibly justify the expenditures.
What are the actual threats to the US from the Mujahedeen of Afghanistan…or the Taliban? As I see it, they simply want us to go away so they continue in their former lifeways. Who are we to tell them what those should or should not be? Our presence there only exacerbates the problem. We are not part of the solution--at least on the ground and militarily. Finally, and most importantly, they have no capability for threatening the US or our interests. And if they did---a small contingent of US special forces troops, unmanned drones, cruise missiles and the all too common high altitude air strikes are (unfortunately) still available to us. The costs-to-benefits analysis supports George Will's proposal. We must pull out.
rjk
Subscribe to:
Post Comments (Atom)
No comments:
Post a Comment